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Abstract
Along with the rapid development of cloud computing technology, container-
ization technology has drawn much attention from both industry and academia.
In this paper, we perform a comparative measurement analysis of Docker-sec,
which is a Linux Security Module proposed in 2018, and a new AppArmor
profile generator called Lic-Sec, which combines Docker-sec with a modified
version of LiCShield, which is also a Linux Security Module proposed in 2015.
Docker-sec and LiCShield can be used to enhance Docker container security
based on mandatory access control and allows protection of the container
without manually configurations. Lic-Sec brings together their strengths
and provides stronger protection. We evaluate the effectiveness and perfor-
mance of Docker-sec and Lic-Sec by testing them with real-world attacks.
We generate an exploit database with 42 exploits effective on Docker con-
tainers selected from the latest 400 exploits on Exploit-db. We launch these
exploits on containers spawned with Docker-sec and Lic-Sec separately. Our
evaluations show that for demanding images, Lic-Sec gives protection for all
privilege escalation attacks for which Docker-sec failed to give protection.
Keywords: Docker-sec, LiCShield, Lic-Sec, Container, Security Evaluation,
Docker.
1. Introduction
Cloud computing is currently a main stream infrastructure technology
and different cloud based architectures are used for all kinds of applications
and industries. Gartner predicts the cloud computing market to reach $200
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billion in 2019 and it is expected to continue to grow1. A key cloud in-
frastructure technology is the container technology [7]. The most popular
containerization ecosystems are Docker and Kubernetes which facilitate the
management, scaling and deployment of the containerized applications.
Linux container is a light-weight OS-level virtualization technology. In
opposition to virtual machines, containers do not embed their own kernel
but run directly on the host kernel [26]. The absence of kernel and kernel-
sharing property make containers light-weight [16]. A problem is that the
kernel-sharing property also makes containers not as secure as virtual ma-
chines. Virtual machines implement a layer called hypervisor to add an
isolation between applications and the host. Containers implement a high-
level interface between guest and host, which hides complexity to the user
at the cost of becoming more complex itself [38]. The absence of hypervisor
in containers makes them more vulnerable to kernel exploits and attacks on
the shared host resources. The authors in [10] present an overview of sev-
eral relevant attacks. Thus, container security issues have become a major
obstacle for wide adoptions of the containerization technology. To address
this issue, Docker implements several Linux kernel security mechanisms such
as Capabilities, Seccomp and Mandatory Access Control (MAC). However,
even with these default security configurations in place, a Docker container
is still vulnerable to many real-world exploits [21].
One of the most efficient way to prevent such kind of attacks is to apply
Linux Security Module (LSM), which is a kernel-level security framework ini-
tially targeting Linux [6]. In this paper, we first studied a recently proposed
LSM called Docker-sec [22]. Docker-sec is a user-friendly security module
based on AppArmor to protect Docker containers through their entire life-
cycle. It was shown by the authors behind Docker-sec that the proposed
LSM is successful in protecting containers from zero-day vulnerabilities with
limited performance overhead [22]. However, so far no-one has evaluated the
Docker-sec strength with respect to protection strength against real-world ex-
ploits. In this paper, we presents such measurement study. Our evaluations
are based on an exploit set extracted from Exploit-DB2. The exploit set was
determined by extracting the exploits in the database which are effective
1https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/cloud-computing-enters-its-second-
decade/
2https://www.exploit-db.com
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against Docker containers only protected with the default security mecha-
nisms. Then we evaluated the security of Docker-sec by manually executing
the exploits on the container platform with Docker-sec enabled. Our results
showed that Docker-sec was efficient to attacks exploiting extra network ac-
cesses or capabilities in addition to the ones actually required for proper
function. In other conditions when the exploited capabilities and networks
are truly required by the application running in the container, Docker-sec
was not efficient. To address this issue, we then introduced the new Ap-
pArmor profile generator tool, Lic-sec. The tool was designed by combining
Docker-sec, with a different, earlier proposed LSM tool called LiCShield [27].
We have adapted and extending LicShield to fit the Docker-sec profile gen-
eration principles. The effectiveness of Lic-Sec was evaluated by using the
very same exploit set as we used for the Docker-sec evaluation. Our measure-
ments shows that Lic-sec manages to give much higher protection level. In
particular, it prevents all privilege escalation attacks which Docker-sec failed
to mitigate.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We have evaluated how Docker-sec performs against real-world attacks.
• We have constructed a new AppArmor profile generator tool that com-
bined Docker-sec with a modified version of an older AppArmor profile
generator, LiCShield, which we call Lic-Sec.
• We show that the new tools performs better than the pure Docker-sec
tools. In particular we show that it gives protection against all privilege
escalation attacks which Docker-sec could not defend against.
• We present performance figures for the new combined profile generation
tool.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a
background to the Docker Architecture, Mandatory Access Control, Docker-
sec and LiCShield. In Section 3, we formulate the main research problem,
i.e, the evaluation goal of Docker-sec and the design goal of the AppArmor
profile generator. In Section 4, we introduce the methodology used in the
evaluation and test setup and we describe how the exploit database was
generated. In Section 5, the main Docker-sec security evaluation results are
presented and a detailed analysis of the results is given. In Section 6, we
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describe the design details for Lic-Sec. In Section 7, the results for security
and performance evaluations for Lic-Sec are introduced as well as an analysis
for the enhancements of Lic-Sec compared to pure Docker-sec. In Section
8, we present and discuss Docker security related work. In Section 9, we
conclude the evaluation study and identify future work.
2. Background
In this section we give a brief background to the Docker technology and
architecture. In addition, we give an overview of key Linux and container
security concept with a focus on the security technologies behind Docker-sec
and LiCShield.
2.1. Docker Architecture and Components
Docker uses a client-server architecture which consists of a server, a REST
API and a command line interface (CLI) client as shown in Figure 1. It
can be further broken into four major components: the Docker server, the
Containerd, the Containerd-shm and the RunC3.
The Docker server is a long-running program which is also called the
Docker daemon. It takes responsibility for the control, creation and manage-
ment of Docker objects such as containers, images, networks and volumns.
The Docker daemon implements the Containerd to manage the life-cycle of
containers. The Containerd uses the RunC to run containers based on Open
Container Initiative (OCI) specifications. The RunC is a command-line tool
for spawning and running containers. It creates a container using Names-
paces, cgroups, filesystem access controls and Linux security capabilities.
After the container actually runs, the RunC exits and hands the control over
to the Containerd-shim, which sits between the Containerd and the RunC.
The shields in Figure 1 indicates the components in the architecture guarded
by Docker-sec.
2.2. Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
In Mandatory Access Control (MAC) systems, mandatory policies gov-
ern access on the basis of classification of subjects and objects in the system.
Each subject and object in the system are assigned a security level. The secu-
rity level associated with an object reflects the sensitivity of the information
contained in the object. The security level associated with a subject, also
3https://docs.docker.com/get-started/overview/
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Figure 1: Docker Architecture and Critical Components
called clearance, reflects the subject’s trustworthiness not to disclose sensi-
tive information to subjects not cleared to see it [33]. There are two kinds
of tools for MAC in Linux: AppArmor and SELinux. SELinux is label-
based and uses a type enforcement model. In SELinux, types are associated
to applications and resources to enforce access rules [28]. Since Docker-sec
evaluated in this paper is based on AppArmor, we will not discuss SELinux
further. Different from SELinux which is based on label, AppArmor is based
on paths. More details of AppArmor and its usage in Docker container are
given in Section 2.3 below.
2.3. AppArmor
AppArmor [1] is integrated in Ubuntu/Debian distributions and it is used
by Docker. Users can define a specific AppArmor profile for a single appli-
cation, restricting what it can do and cannot do based on paths. In this
way, even if the attacker has succeeded in exploiting vulnerabilities in an
application, the behavior of the compromised application is still restricted
by AppArmor.
When a container is started by Docker, a default AppArmor profile named
’docker-default’ will be generated by Docker binary and loaded into the ker-
nel for the container runtime. There is also an AppArmor profile for the
5
Docker daemon but it is currently not installed with Docker4. Generally, the
default pre-defined AppArmor profile for container is moderately protective
to provide wide application compatibility. The default profile for instance
forbids mount operations. It also denies access to important file systems
on the host [9]. However, the default Docker AppArmor profile does not
restrict the network and capability rules. This brings high risk of the host
suffered from privilege escalation attacks through a compromised container.
Besides the pre-defined profile of Docker, administrators can also define and
implement their own profiles which provides more strict restrictions. This
requires advanced configuration skills by the person responsible for deploying
the Docker application.
2.4. Docker-sec
The authors in [22] propose a novel security mechanism for Docker based
on AppArmor which is called Docker-sec. Docker-sec adds an additional
security layer on top of Docker’s security defaults by automatically creating
per-container AppArmor profiles.
The AppArmor policy improved by Docker-sec has three major advan-
tages compared to the default AppArmor policy loaded and enforced by
Docker: 1) It protects the container through its whole life-cycle by generat-
ing secure profiles for all the critical Docker components as shown in Fig.1.
The default AppArmor profile only protects the container after the initial-
ization by the RunC. 2) It generates per-container AppArmor profiles rather
than the common secure profile compatible to all containers. 3) The Ap-
pArmor profile for each container is dynamic and can be adapted to any
behavior change of the container by collecting the behavior of the container
during training period and then determining the privileges that are truly
necessary for the container to run properly.
2.5. LiCShield
LiCShield framework was presented in [27] for securing Docker containers
and their workloads by automatically generating AppArmor rules for both
the host and the Docker container. In brief, LiCShield traces all kernel
operations by the trace tool called SystemTap5 while the Docker daemon is
performing the build and run operations. LiCShield translates all the traces
to AppArmor rules and constructs two different AppArmor profiles: one
4https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/apparmor/
5https://sourceware.org/systemtap/
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targeted to the operations performed inside the container, the other one to
those performed on the host.
LiCShield is similar to Docker-sec in design principles since both of them
provide automatic AppArmor profile construction but with the following dif-
ferences as listed in Table 1. First, we explain the differences that highlight
the strengths of LiCShield: 1) LiCShield uses SystemTap as the tracing tool.
This tool is more flexible than Auditd used by Docker-sec as it allows cus-
tomizing the tracing script according to user’s needs. Users can monitor and
investigate a variety of kernel functions, system calls6 and process-related
activities7, etc. This feature enhances the extensibility of LiCShield; 2) LiC-
Shield generates important rules which Docker-sec cannot generate, including
pivot root rule, access rule, mount rule, link rule and execution rule. These
rules could be used as the supplementary to the rules generated by Docker-
sec. 3) LiCShield automatically constructs the profile for the Docker daemon
based on its executions, which confines the privilege to the bare minimum
needed for the proper function. While Docker-sec adopts a pre-defined Ap-
pArmor profile for the Docker daemon, which is moderately protective.
Besides the strengths, LiCShield has several weaknesses compared to
Docker-sec since LiCShield is incompatible with the latest Docker releases8:
1) LiCShield does not generate any profile for the RunC; 2) LiCShield does
not give good runtime container protection. This is caused by the principles
behind how LiCShield enforces the container protection profile. LiCShield
exploits the pivot root rule in the host profile to enforce the container pro-
tection. In earlier Docker versions, the Docker daemon calls the pivot root
right before starting the container processes. Hence, for older Docker ver-
sions, this it is the right point to switch from the host profile to the container
profile. But in current Docker versions, the RunC takes over this task from
the Docker Daemon. Therefore, the pivot root rule cannot be used anymore
for this purpose.
3. Problem description
We believe AppArmore automatic profile generation has great potential
in enhancing the security of containers. It is a major advantage if the profiles
6https://sourceware.org/systemtap/SystemTap Beginners Guide/scripts.html
7https://sourceware.org/systemtap//man/tapset::kprocess.3stap.html
8https://github.com/docker/docker-ce/releases/tag/v19.03.8
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Table 1: Comparison between Docker-sec and LiCShield
LSM year MAC tracing tool generated rules generated profiles pre-defined profiles effective protective range
Docker-sec 2018 AppArmor Auditd
capability rule
network rule
container runtime
RunC
Docker Daemon
container
RunC
Docker Daemon
LiCShield 2015 AppArmor SystemTap
pivot root rule
access rule
mount rule
link rule
execution rule
container runtime
Docker Daemon
/ Docker Daemon
can be automatically generated in order to avoid forcing the end-user to make
cumbersome manual configuration. However, despite this fact, it is an open
research question to measure the security strength of AppArmor profiles.
There is also a need to design enhanced automatic profile generation tools
providing good protection.
The aim of our research is to provide a quantitative evaluation of the ef-
fectiveness of automatically generated AppArmor profiles in protecting con-
tainers against different types of exploits, in order to identify the strengths
and weaknesses of the profiles and find an enhanced profile generator to avoid
the weaknesses. To accomplish this goal, we break the problem down into
the following three sub-problems: 1) find a methodology and test framework
for evaluating the strength of automatically generated AppArmor profiles
for Docker containers; 2) use the methodology and test framework to evalu-
ate the strength of Docker-sec and identify potential weaknesses; 3) find an
enhanced profile generator offering higher security than Docker-sec.
4. Experimental setup
Next, we describe the experimental set-up we have used in our evalua-
tion. First we discuss how we classify attacks, then we describe how we have
collected the exploit used in the tests and finally we explain how the actual
tests were executed.
4.1. Attack Classification
We have chosen to use a similar two-dimensional method for classification
as suggested by Lin et al. in [21] but with the following differences: 1) We
choose the targeting objects of the attacks as the first dimension which is
slightly different from the influence range used in [21] . We consider this
way more intuitive and straight-forward since the targeting objects could be
obtained directly from the official descriptions of vulnerabilities in National
Vulnerability Database (NVD). 2) We also choose the impacts of the attacks
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as the second dimension but with different approaches, i.e, we determine
the impacts of the attacks based on the vulnerability type for each attack
provided by NVD as shown in Table 2.
First, we classify the exploits based on the targeting objects, i.e., Web Ap-
plication, Server, Database and Kernel. These are obtained from the ”Known
Affected Software Configurations” of vulnerability provided by NVD. Second,
we classify the exploits into five categories based on the impacts of attacks.
In order to summarize the impacts of all the attacks, we manually analyze
the vulnerability type for each attack provided by NVD. The vulnerability
type is defined by CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration)9. For each type,
CWE defines its negative technical impact when the exploit is successfully
used. We classify similar impacts into the same category. Then we obtain
five categories: Bypass, Gain Privilege, Denial of Service (DoS), Gain Infor-
mation and Execute Code, which are listed in Table 2. Compared to the
Lin et al. work, we introduce one more category called ”bypass”, which is
explained in details here. We here also further discuss privilege escalation
attacks, which is the most important security class with respect to container
security.
Table 2: Classification of different attack types
Impact Category
Bypass Protection Mechanism Bypass
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity Gain Privilege
Modify Application Data
Modify Files or Directories
Modify Memory
DoS: CPU Resource Consumption
Denial of Service
(DoS)
DoS: Memory Resource Consumption
DoS: Resource Consumption (Other)
DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart
DoS: Instability
Read Application Data Gain Information
Read Memory
Read Files or Directories
Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands Execute Code
• Bypass: By bypassing a protection mechanism, an attacker gain unau-
thorized access to a system. There are two general ways for attackers
to bypass a protection mechanism; either gaining unauthorized access
to a system by exploiting insecure interaction between components or
9https://cwe.mitre.org/data/index.html
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by compromising security functionality by risky resource management.
The first way is commonly used in injection attacks and Cross-Site Re-
quest Forgery (CSRF) attacks. The second way is commonly used in
DoS type of attacks.
• Gain Privilege: Kernel vulnerabilities are used by attackers to gain
unauthorized privileges of the container and the host. Depending on the
effective range of the gained privilege, there are two kinds of privilege
escalation attacks:
– Inside container: Docker provides 14 capabilities for the root
user in containers instead of 38 capabilities for the real root user
in the host. However, an attacker can bypass the CPU protec-
tion mechanisms and exploit kernel vulnerabilities to get the real
root privilege, i.e., to obtain the full 38 capabilities. When using
an exploit in this category, the attacker is still restricted inside
the container and has no access to the underlying host and other
containers running on the same host.
– Container escape: In a successful container escape attack, the
attacker not only gets the real root inside the container, but also
breaks the isolation between containers and the underlying host.
After a successful attack, it is possible for the attacker to mod-
ify critical files or memory of the host and further influence or
change other containers through the host. For example, CVE-
2019-573610, a vulnerability of RunC, allows an attacker to over-
write the host RunC binary and consequently obtain host root
access. Another example is a Namespaces switching attack which
we describe in more details in the analysis in Section 5.2.
• Denial of Service (DoS): A DoS attack results in resource exhaus-
tion or disability. An attacker can utilize a DoS attack to slow down
or crash the software and deny service to legitimate users.
• Gain Information: Attackers can read the critical application data,
files, directories and memory to gain sensitive information such as cre-
dentials, passwords and keys.
10https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-5736
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• Execute Code: A remote attacker can execute arbitrary codes on a
victim’s computer, generally targeting on Web Applications and servers.
o
4.2. Exploit Database Collection
We generated our exploit database collection using similar principle as
presented in [21] but modified to suit the Docker-sec evaluation target. In
[21], the authors collected the latest 100 exploits of each category from
Exploit-db11 and filtered out the exploits which would probably fail on the
container platform such as the ones attacking the graphic user interface re-
lated program. Finally, they got 223 exploits out of 400 exploits which
might be effective on container platform. In our evaluation, the purpose
is to obtain the exploits which are actually effective on container platform
with Docker default security mechanism. To achieve this, we processed the
exploit database through three steps. First, we generated the universe set of
exploits from Exploit-db. Second, we did a first-round filter to filter out the
exploits which are not commonly deployed in containers. Third, we applied a
second-round filter to filter out the exploits which failed to launch the attacks
on containers with just default security mechanisms enabled.
• Generation of universe set of exploits: We used the same method
as [21] to generate the original 400 exploits collection from Exploit-
db. Exploit-db is the oldest and most comprehensive database of real-
world exploit code for several platforms such as Windows, Linux, etc.
Exploit-db divides the exploits into four categories: Web Application,
remote, local & privilege escalation, and denial of service. Based on
the four categories, we collected the latest 100 exploits of each category
targeting on Linux platform before December 31, 2019. Among the
400 exploits, 126 exploits were published in 2019. 190 exploits were
published in 2018. 75 exploits were published in 2017 and 2016. Only
9 exploits were published before 2016.
• First-round filter: The purpose with this step was to obtain the
exploits which might be effective on container platforms. We used the-
oretical investigations mainly focusing on exploits of user space pro-
grams. We studied the text description of each exploit manually to
11https://www.exploit-db.com
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confirm the affected user space program. Then we investigated the
application based on the following criteria: 1) The exploits targeting
graphic user interface (GUI) applications were filtered out since con-
tainers are generally used for deploying back-end services such as web
server and database server; 2) The exploits targeting back-end appli-
cations, which are not generally used in containers, were filtered out
since containers are designed for hosting single service in a single pro-
cess. As recommended by Docker developers [13], it is not suitable to
deploy an application running as a platform which integrating several
applications. For example, EDB-ID 4678512 targeting Ruby On Rails
were filtered out. This is a Web Applicationlication framework that
includes everything needed to create database-backed Web Applica-
tionlications.
• Second-round filter: The purpose with the second step was to obtain
the exploits that bypass all the default Docker protection mechanisms.
These exploits are the most severe threats against the container and
by testing them, we get a good view of the strengths and weaknesses
of Docker-sec. First, we analyzed the exploit code and text description
of CVE to figure out the attack principle and necessary conditions to
carry out the attacks. Then we implemented the exploit code on a
Docker container to see if the exploit was actually effective with the
default Docker security configurations. We used the same method as
in [21] for the exploits targeting user space programs, i.e we deployed
the vulnerable programs inside the container and ran the exploits out-
side the container. For the exploits which target the Linux kernel, we
deployed the vulnerable kernel on the host and executed the exploits
inside the container.
After the two-round filter of the universe set of exploits, we obtained the final
exploit database collection for our evaluation. For each exploit, we collected
the EDB ID (Exploit Database IDentifier), CVE (Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures IDentifier) ID, publishing date, CVE type, exploit code to
launch the attack, targeting object and text description of CVE. Then we
utilized the classification method described in Section 3.1 to classify the
exploit database. The number of exploits in the final database according to
12https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46785
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the classification is listed in Table 3.
Table 3: Exploit Database Collection
Categories
Objects
Web Application Server Database Kernel Total
Bypass 6 3 − − 9
Gain Privilege
(Inside Container)
− − 2 4 6
Gain Privilege
(Container Escape)
− − − 4 4
DoS 3 1 − 1 5
Gain
Information
2 2 1 − 5
Execute Code 15 2 − − 17
Total 22 8 3 9 42∗
*: Total number is less than the sum of all rows in the column. This is because
some exploits cause more than one consequences.
4.3. Test Setup
We used Docker 19.03.1-ce for the evaluations. This version was released
on 25th July 2019 and supports Linux kernel security mechanism including
Capability, Seccomp and MAC. Furthermore, on the host we ran the Linux
distribution Ubuntu 14.04 LTS with kernel version 4.4.0-51-generic. This
kernel version was chosen to guarantee that the host kernel is vulnerable to all
the kernel vulnerabilities in the selected exploit collection. This is obviously a
requirement in order to do the security evaluation based on existing exploits.
Docker-sec can generate the container profile through two mechanisms:
static analysis and dynamic monitoring. In the static analysis mode, the pro-
file is generated based on information about the container and the type of
access rights it needs, which is either provided by the users as the command
line arguments or generated by Docker. However, customizing these config-
urations is very time-consuming and if the user does not customize docker
run, the resulting profile will be the same as the default AppArmor profile
provided by Docker.
Therefore, in our test, we directly enabled the dynamic monitoring for
Docker-sec and we saved the runtime profile for each tested application for
further analysis. We enabled dynamic monitoring by executing docker-sec
train-start and docker-sec train-stop command. During this two commands
we performed all the required application functionalities. Then Docker-sec
replaced capabilities and network accesses in the initial profile generated by
static analysis, with the necessary capabilities and network accesses collected
during the training period.
13
5. Evaluation of Docker-sec
Now, we present the exploit test results obtained in the study. We start
by discussing the overall results and then we put special attention to the
privilege escalation attacks, which we treat in a separate sub section.
5.1. Test Result Analysis
Based on the targeting objects, we divide the exploits into two categories:
user space program targeted exploits and kernel targeted exploits. User space
targets include Web Applicationlications, server and database while the only
kernel target considered is the Linux kernel. The results are displayed in
Table 4.
• User space program targeted exploits: Some user space tar-
geted exploits, which require Linux capabilities and network accesses
to launch, can be defended by Docker-sec. Since we ’train’ the run-
time profile by Docker-sec and discard the unnecessary capabilities and
network accesses, not all required conditions to launch some of these
attacks are fulfilled. For example, EDB-4096813 exploits CVE-2016-
10033 to launch a remote code execution against PHPMailer. With
the default runtime profile, the attack was successful. However, after
training the container with Docker-sec, the capabilities were limited to
’setuid’ and ’setgid’ only, and the network accesses were constrained
to ’netlink raw’, ’inet stream’, ’inet dgram’, ’inet6 stream’ and ’inet6
dgram’. The attack failed under these restrictions due to the lack of
network accesses: network unix dgram and network unix stream.
The rest of the application-targeted attacks succeeded even with the
Docker-sec generated AppArmor profile. The main reason is that these
exploits do not directly depend on Linux capabilities or network ac-
cesses. Instead, these attacks generally exploits some common Web
Application vulnerabilities such as injection, cross-site request forgery
and unrestricted upload of file with dangerous type. It is worth to no-
tice though, that even if this is the case, Docker-sec is still effective in
the sense that attack is isolated to the container and will not affect any
program running outside of it.
• Kernel targeted exploits: When it comes to kernel-targeted ex-
13https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40968
14
ploits, Docker-sec is much more effective as it restricts container ca-
pabilities. In particular, in the cases when the users run the Docker
container on a host with kernel version 4.4.0. As Docker-sec reduces
the capabilities to those really needed, several attacks can be prevented.
However, clearly, if some rules are truly required during container run-
time, then Docker-sec cannot discard these capabilities opening up for
kernel-targeted exploits. In order to evaluate the defense performance
in real-life application scenarios, we test the top 20 official Docker im-
ages pulled from Docker hub14 with Docker-sec and we found that
only two images, ’Docker in Docker’ and ’IBM DB2’ are vulnerable
to the majority of the attacks. For the remaining tested 18 images, the
Docker-sec generated profile gives the expected protection as also can
be seen in Table 4. We analyze the failed cases in further details in
Section 5.2 below.
5.2. Analysis of Privilege Escalation Attacks
Once a kernel-targeted exploit is launched successfully inside a container,
the attacker will get root privilege and will be able to break the isolation by
escaping from the container to the host. This is the far most severe type of
attack and in this section we dig deeper into the analysis and test results
with respect to privilege escalation. Our focus is to analyze the efficiency
of Docker-sec in restricting the attack ranges and minimizing the impacts.
As we described in Section 4.1, there are two types of privilege escalation
attacks. Below, we discuss the test results with respect to these two types
separately.
• Inside container: We tested 4 exploits. Among these, 3 of them
(CVE-2017-730815, CVE-2017-607416 and CVE-2017-100011217 require
capability SYS ADMIN to launch and 1 (CVE-2016-979318) requires
capability NET ADMIN. If none of these capabilities are given to the
container, all of these attacks fail. This is the reason Docker-sec pro-
tects the 18 tested images from the 4 exploits. During the images’ run-
time, Docker-sec discards the NET ADMIN and SYS ADMIN since
14https://hub.docker.com/search?q=&type=image
15https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41994
16https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41458
17https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43418
18https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41995
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they are not necessary for the images to run properly. However, for
the ’Docker in Docker’ and ’IBM DB2’ images, Docker-sec adds these
two capabilities into the runtime profile after the training period and
consequently the privilege escalation attacks succeed.
Docker-sec is not any more effective after privilege escalation inside
the container. In these attacks, once the real root privilege has been
obtained inside the container, a root shell with a new PID is spawned.
This process with real root privilege is not enforced by Docker-sec run-
time profile and Docker-sec has no protection effect anymore. However,
it should be noted that even if the capability restriction and MAC under
these attack circumstance not are effective anymore, the Namespaces
isolation and Docker Seccomp profile protections are still working. This
means that the default read-only restriction for file access still applies
despite the attacker root access. Therefore, the attack only affects
resources inside the container and the host remains unaffected.
• Container escape: Typically, the attacker switches the Namespaces
to the one of the host or hosts to launch the container escape attack. We
tested 4 exploits based on this mechanism. As there is no ’ready-made’
exploit code to launch these attacks, we used a well proven technol-
ogy19 to test this attack procedure. The root kernel exploits which
we based our tests on were CVE-2017-1000112, CVE-2016-9793, CVE-
2017-7308 and CVE-2017-6074. Among these exploits, three exploits
need capability SYS ADMIN to launch and one exploit needs capability
CAP ADMIN to launch. The attack procedure we used is as follows.
First, the attacker bypasses the Kernel Address-space Layout Random-
ization (KASLR) mechanism to get the kernel base address. Since the
offsets of kernel symbols are constant to the kernel base address, it
is easy to obtain the kernel symbol addresses through /proc/kallsyms
which will be used in the container escape attack. Next, the attacker
calls the kernel function find task by vpid to obtain the task struct
of virtual process 1, which is the first process inside the container.
Then the attacker further calls the switch task Namespaces() function
to change attackers’ process’s Namespaces to those of the host’s. The
19https://www.cyberark.com/threat-research-blog/the-route-to-root-container-escape-
using-kernel-exploitation/
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input parameters for switch task namespaces() function are task struct
of process 1, which is obtained in the previous step, and the address
of init nsproxy structure which contains the Namespaces of the initial
process of the host. Finally, the attacker calls the setns syscall from
the kernel exploit to perform the required Namespaces changes and
then escape to the host. The defending principle of the container es-
cape attacks is the same as the privilege escalation inside containers
as we previously described. Docker-sec discards those two capabilities
for the 19 images runtime. The cause of failure for image ’Docker in
Docker’ and ’IBM DB2’is also the same. Docker-sec considers these
two capabilities as necessary and adds them into the runtime profile.
Table 4: Docker-sec Security Evaluation Result Overview
Exploits Userspace program targeted Kernel targeted
Categories
Objects Web Application
(Doc/Sec1)
Server
(Doc/Sec1)
Database
(Doc/Sec1)
Other images
(Doc/Sec1)
Docker in Docker
IBM DB2
(Doc/Sec1)
Bypass 6/6 3/3 − − −
Gain Privilege
(Inside Container)
− − 2/2 4/0 4/4
Gain Privilege
(Container Escape)
− − − 4/0 4/4
DoS 3/3 1/1 − 1/0 1/1
Gain
Information
2/2 2/2 1/1 − −
Execute Code 15/14 2/2 − − −
Total 22/21 8/8 3/3 9/0 9/9
1: ’Doc’ denotes the number of exploits executed successfully on containers launched with Docker, ’Sec’
denotes the number of exploits executed successfully on containers launched with Docker-sec
6. Lic-Sec - combining Docker-sec with LiCShield
Now we proceed with describing our enhancements to Docker-sec with
the purpose of getting an overall stronger profile generator. We call our new
tool, Lic-Sec, an AppArmor profile generator which combine Docker-sec and
LiCShield. First we discuss the Lic-Sec design motivations. Then, we show
the modifications we have done to LiCShield as well as their purposes. Next,
we describe how Lic-Sec works and the main differences compared to Docker-
sec. In the end, we explain how to use the tool in different user scenarios.
6.1. The design of Lic-Sec
The design of Lic-Sec is motivated by the evaluation results of Docker-
sec. As concluded in Section 5.1 and 5.2, the Docker-sec limitation with
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respect to only restricting capabilities or networks imply that we cannot de-
fend against some of the attacks. Based on the analysis of the differences
between LiCShield and Docker-sec discussed in Section 2.5, we notice that
if one try to combine LiCShield with Docker-sec, we will be able to give a
higher level of protection and potential addressing the shortcomings identi-
fied with respect to Docker-sec defense strength. Especially, LiCShield has
the potential to collect more system information and generate additional
protection rules (compare to Docker-sec) such as pivot root rules, file access
rules, mount rules, link rules and execution rules. Those rules generated
for the container could be combined with the capability and network rules
generated by Docker-sec to construct a profile with more strict restrictions,
broader container run-time analysis, giving and overall more flexible tool.
In summary, the design goals for the combined tool are: 1) automatic
construction of AppArmor profiles for per-container and all the Docker com-
ponents; 2) more strict confinement of the privileges inside the container; 3)
support for extensibility of functionality
6.2. The modifications of LiCShield
Based on the design goal of Lic-Sec, we made the following modifications
of LiCShield.
1. We modified LiCShields approach of enforcing container profile in or-
der to enforce per-container profile with more rules. We changed the
way AppArmor profiles are enforced. Instead of using the LicShield ap-
proach where a profile is enforced with a pivot root rule on the host, we
used the LicShield profile generator but applied them using the Docker
sec enforcement principle.
2. We modified LiCShields SystemTap script in order to trace all processes
triggered by different Docker components. First, we add one more field
to the trace log structure called ’executable process name’ in order to
identify processes with empty executable path such as ’runc:[2:INIT]’.
Second, we enable the trace for processes also for processes which are
not in the target tree.
3. We modified LiCShields rules generator from two aspects: first, we gen-
erate deny rules for prompting shells inside container in order to defend
privilege escalation attacks. If no command such as /bin/bash,/bin/sh
and /bin/dash is tracked during the tracing period, operations of r
(read), w (write), m (memory map as executable), k (file locking), l
(creation hard links) and x (execute) to those commands are all denied
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by adding the deny rules to the container profile. Second, we change
the way of classifying generated rules to container profiles and host
profiles in order to identify profiles more accurately.
4. We modified Docker-secs training process and rules generator in order
to automate the generation of mount rules. We add auditing for mount
operations when training process starts in addition to the Docker-sec
network and capabilities. We also add a function for generating mount
rules based on the Auditd log.
6.3. The mechanisms of Lic-Sec
Here we list the main mechanisms of Lic-Sec which include tracing and
profile generation. The whole process is displayed in figure 2.
Figure 2: Lic-Sec Approach Overview
1) tracing: Tracing is the procedure of the new profile generator to collect
necessary information as the basis to generate rules. SystemTap and Auditd
are leveraged as the tracing tools. When the tracing starts, SystemTap and
Auditd work in parallel: the former one collects kernel operations performed
by all the Docker components based on a pre-defined trace script and the
latter one collects mount operations, capability operations and network op-
erations performed by the running container. The structure of SystemTap
trace can be customized and flexible while the structure of Auditd trace is
defined by Auditd and fixed. We design the structure for SystemTap trace
based on LiCShield. We add one more field called executable process name
(marked with a star) in addition to LiCShield. The new structure has the
following fields:
〈probe point name〉 〈control group path〉 〈executable process name〉 〈ex-
ecutable path〉 〈resources path〉 〈mount namespace root〉.
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• probe point name: the name of the kernel function probed, which
identifies the required privileged operation. For example, when ’se-
curity sb pivotroot’ function is probed, the pivot root privilege is re-
quired. Lic-Sec identifies the type of the rule depending on this field.
• control group path: identifies the source of the request, either from
the container or from the host. This is used for distinguish the op-
erations between inside the container and the host and classify the
generated rules to container profile and host profile.
• executable process name*: the name of the process which performs
the operation. This field is introduced since we could not identify
the process from the executable path for some processes such as the
RunC:INIT.
• executable path: the executable path of the process which performs
the operation, acting as the subject of the privilege operation.
• resources path: the resource involved in the operation, acting as the
object of the privilege operation.
• mount namespace root: identifies the involved resource’s mount
point, which could also be used for identifying where the request comes
from. Since if the operation is performed inside the container, the
mount point locates in the Overlay2 filesystem.
The Auditd trace has the following three structures, corresponding to capa-
bility rule, network access rule and mount rule, respectively:
〈apparmor〉 〈operation〉 〈profile〉 〈pid〉 〈comm〉 〈capability〉 〈capname〉
〈apparmor〉 〈operation〉 〈profile〉 〈pid〉 〈comm〉 〈family〉 〈sock type〉 〈pro-
tocol〉 〈requested mask〉 〈addr〉
〈apparmor〉 〈operation〉 〈profile〉 〈name〉 〈pid〉 〈comm〉 〈fstype〉 〈srcname〉
〈flags〉 〈options〉
• apparmor: the status of AppArmor. The value for this field could
be ’DENY’, ’ALLOW’, ’STATUS’ and ’AUDIT’ depending on AppAr-
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mor’s status. ’AUDIT’ represents that this log could be used for gen-
erating rules.
• operation: the performed operation, which is used for distinguishing
logs related to capabilities (operation
=’capable’) from the ones related to network accesses.
• profile: the enforced AppArmor profile reporting the privileged at-
tempts. Lic-Sec uses this field to find out logs for the specified container
which is confined by this profile.
• capname: the name for the capability, which is added to the capability
rules in the profile.
• family: supported domains for the network such as inet, inet6 and
unix, which is added to the network rules in the profile.
• sock type:supported types for the network such as stream, dgram,
and raw, which is added to the network rules in the profile.
• protocol: supported protocol numbers for the network which represent
different protocols such as tcp, udp and icmp. It is also added to the
network rules in the profile.
• name: the target mountpoint fileglob, should be a path, which is used
for generating mount rules.
• srcname: the source fileglob, which is used for generating mount rules.
• fstype: the allowed filesystem type such as ’ext4, debugfs, devfs’,
which is used for generating mount rules.
• flags: the allowed flags, such as ’ro, rw, etc’, which is used for gener-
ating mount rules.
2) profile generation: the profiles are generated automatically through
analyzing the trace files. Our rules generator engine grabs the key fields
from the traces and combines them based on different syntax of different
rules.
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• trace file: The algorithm for translating the SystemTap trace to rules
is shown as Algorithm 1. This is done by a Python script based on
LiCShields implementation with our improvements. First, raw data of
the trace file is collected line by line. For each line, we determine the
applied rule (pivot root rule, link rule, file access rule, mount rule or
execution rule) according to the field ’probe point name’. Second, the
rules are classified into different profiles according to the fields ’control
group path’, ’executable process name’ and ’executable path’. Third,
the fields ’executable process name’, ’executable path’, ’resource path’
and ’mount namespace root’ are input to the engine to generate rules.
Lic-Sec introduces a new function: when generating the execution rules
for the container, it checks if the execution is for prompting shells. If
no such executions are traced, it adds the deny rules for all shell com-
mands in the container profile. Forth, the container rules are written
into the AppArmor profile which has been enforced upon containers
launch instead of a newly created profile, which gives real-time con-
tainer protection enforcement.
• auditd log: The translation from the Auditd trace to capability rules,
network access rules and mount rules are more straightforward using a
bash script. For the capability rules and network access rules, we follow
Docker-secs approach directly. Based on Auditd trace structures de-
scribed in section 7.2.1, first, we sort out capability traces generated by
the running container by searching traces with ’profile=〈profile name〉’,
’apparmor=AUDIT’ and ’operation=capable’. Here, the profile name
is a known name of the enforced AppArmor profile for the container.
Second, we get the capability used inside container from the field cap-
name of these traces. We add them to container profile as the capability
rules using the following syntax:
capability 〈capname〉
In a similar way, to generate the network accesses rules, first we search
out traces with ’profile=〈profile name〉’ and ’apparmor=AUDIT’, in-
cluding the fields: ’family’, ’sock type’ and ’protocol’. Second, we
combine the values in these three fields to generate the network access
rules using the following syntax:
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network 〈family〉 〈sock type〉 〈protocol〉
To generate the mount rules, first, we grab the mount operation per-
formed by the container through searching traces with ’profile=〈profile name〉’,
’apparmor=AUDIT’ and ’operation=mount’. Second, we get the val-
ues in these key fields ’fstype’, ’srcname’, ’name’ and ’flags’ from those
traces and combine them to a mount rule using the following syntax:
mount fstype=〈fstype〉 options=〈flags〉 〈srcname〉 -〉 〈name〉
Algorithm 1: Update container profile and host profile based on
trace file
Result: Updated container profile and host profile
input trace file, container profile, host profile;
deny shell flag = True;
for line in trace file do
applied rules = rules dispatcher(probe point name);
layer = get layer(control group path);
rules = applied rules(executable process name, executable path,
resources path, mount namespace root);
if rules == ’execution permission rule’ and resources path in
[’/bin/bash’, ’/bin/sh’, ’/bin/dash’] then
deny shell flag = False;
end
if layer == ’container’ then
container profile.add(rules);
else
host profile.add(rules);
end
end
if deny shell flag == True then
container profile.add(deny shell rules);
end
generate container profile;
generate host profile;
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6.4. Using Lic-Sec
Lic-Sec is user-friendly to use. We provide docker-licsec commands as well
as a bash script to run Lic-Sec. Lic-sec can be run in three different modes
depending on the usage scenario as displayed in figure 3. Each mode has a
different tracing period. Independent of the mode used, the tracing period
can be terminated with the same command at any time after the containers
launch. Below, we describe the three different modes in more details:
• mode 1: Mode 1 is designed for the scenario where comprehensive
profiles for both the host and the container are needed. This mode
starts SystemTap tracing before the Docker daemon is launched and
starts the Auditd auditing after container is launched. Therefore, users
can get all the kernel operations related to the Docker daemon, the
containerd, the containerd-shim and the RunC from the very beginning
of the container’s life-cycle. The users need to run the bash script to
enter this mode and use docker-licsec trace-stop to quit.
• mode 2: Mode 2 is designed for the scenario where users only need
to know the kernel operations done by the container from its initial-
ization. This mode starts the SystemTap tracing right before the con-
tainer launching and starts the Auditd auditing immediately once the
container finishes initialization. Therefore, it traces the container build
process by tracing the executions inside the Dockerfile specified by the
image developer. Users can use the docker-licsec run command to enter
this mode and use docker-licsec trace-stop to quit.
• mode 3: Mode 3 is designed for the scenario where flexible trace of the
container is needed which allows users to start the tracing at any time
during container’s runtime. This mode is similar to the training period
of Docker-sec. It only traces the container’s running process. User
specifies a tracing period for a specific container by running command
docker-licsec trace-start and docker-licsec trace-stop, during which Lic-
Sec collects information about the properties of the container. Users
are supposed to perform all required executions and use all required
application functionalities in order to feed necessary data to Lic-Sec
and generate a profile with accurate restrictions. The tracing process
is repeatable until users capture all the required functionality of the
container.
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Figure 3: Lic-Sec Modes and Usage
7. Security and performance evaluations of Lic-Sec
Next, we investigate the security strength of Lic-Sec. We use the same
exploit based evaluation principles as we use for the Docker-sec testing (see
Section 5). We also use the very same exploit database and the main focus of
the evaluation is the most severe exploits and configurations which Docker-
sec did not manage to defend, i.e. the privilege escalation attacks.
7.1. Evaluation Result Analysis
In the evaluation with Docker-sec, we conclude that if the capabilities
and networks exploited by the attacks are truly required during container
runtime, then Docker-sec cannot discard these rules hence fails to defend
those kernel-targeted exploits. In the evaluation of Lic-Sec, we launched the
exploits from the exploit dataset again in the Docker containers protected
by Lic-Sec. We found that, compared to Docker-sec, Lic-Sec successfully
defended 8 more kernel-targeted exploits aiming to gain privilege inside con-
tainers and on the host, in the Docker container running image ’Docker in
Docker’ and ’IBM DB2’. For other userspace program targeted attacks, Lic-
Sec has the same performance as Docker-sec (see also Table 4).
We list the defense principles of Lic-Sec for both the privilege escalation
attacks inside containers and the corresponding container escape attacks in
Table 5. The EDB-ID is the ID of the privilege escalation exploits launched
inside container. For the container escape attacks, as explained in Section
5.2, since we used a well proven technology and modified the original exploit,
there is no official EDB-ID for those attacks.
We have made a detailed analysis of the profile generation and protection
mechanism with respect to the exploits mitigation: Since Lic-Sec does not
identify any prompted shells during the tracing, it generates the correspond-
ing deny rules for shell prompting therefore blocking the call of functions
such as system() and execl(), which need to execute shell commands. The
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system() function uses fork() to create a child process that executes the shell
command using execl(’/bin/sh’, ’sh’, ’-c’, command, (char *) NULL). Since
the execution of ’/bin/sh’ is denied by Lic-Sec, the command cannot be ex-
ecuted any more. For example, exploit 43418 calls system(/sbin/ifconfig lo
mtu 1500) to change MTU of interface ’lo’ to 1500. Exploit 41994 and 41458
call system(’/sbin/ifconfig lo up’) to activate interface ’lo’. Similarly, exploit
41995 calls execl(’/bin/bash’, ’bash’, NULL) after gaining root privilege to
open a shell with new Namespaces, which is also be defended by Lic-Sec.
The container escape attacks are based on the corresponding gain privilege
attacks inside containers, so they have the same attack principles. Therefore,
due to the failed call of those functions, these exploits could not be launched
as well.
Table 5: Lic-Sec Security Evaluation Result Overview
image
exploit
category
effective
range
EDB-ID CVE-ID
vulnerable
kernel
Lic-Sec Defense principle
Docker
in
Docker
IBM Db2
Gain
privilege
inside container 43418
CVE-2017-1000112 up to 4.13.9
AppArmor denies the call of function system()
during exploiting.
container escape -
inside container 41994
CVE-2017-7308 up to 4.10.6
container escape -
inside container 41458
CVE-2017-6074 up to 4.9.11
container escape -
inside container 41995
CVE-2016-9793 up to 4.8.13
AppArmor denies the execution of function
execl(’/bin/bash’, ’bash’, NULL) after gaining root privilege.container escape -
7.2. Performance
We evaluated the performance for the three modes of Lic-Sec from two
aspects: the profile generation time and the booting time. We collected the
10 most-used images from the Docker hub and used them for our performance
measurements. When evaluating the performance for mode 1, we compared
Lic-Sec with the pure LiShield since mode 1 corresponds to the LicShield
tracing and profile generation principle. For mode 2 and mode 3, we compare
Lic-Sec with the pure Docker-sec since these two modes are designed based
on Docker-sec’s framework. We ran each image with Lic-Sec and LiCShield
or Docker-sec respectively for 10 times and calculated the average time after
10 rounds test for each image.
The results for Lic-Sec mode1 and pure LiCShield are shown in figure 4
and figure 5. The overhead introduced by Lic-Sec regarding profile generation
time is nearly ignorable. In terms of the bootstrap time, Lic-Sec introduces
much more overhead due to the running of Docker-sec in parallel. The com-
parison of execution time for starting and terminating the trace between
Lic-Sec’s mode2 and Docker-sec are shown in figure 6 and figure 7. Lic-Sec
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utilizes 2 more seconds in average then Docker-sec to start the trace, which
is caused by the running of SystemTap trace. When SystemTap is set up, it
first compiles the trace script into kernel modules and loads them into the
kernel, which introduces some extra time. Considering the time for terminat-
ing the trace, Lic-Sec mode2 consumed more time than Docker-sec in general
but showed different performances depending on images. For images such as
ubuntu, redis and server JRE, Lic-Sec mode2 didn’t introduce obvious extra
execution time. However, for images such as weblogic server and Oracle DB,
Lic-Sec mode2 consumed much more time to stop the trace. This increase in
time is due to the fact that many more kernel operations were traced by Lic-
Sec during the launch time for these images, which increased the workload of
profile generator engine. The comparison of execution time for starting and
terminating the trace between Lic-Sec’s mode3 and Docker-sec are shown in
figure 8 and figure 9. Considering the trace termination time in this case, we
found that Lic-Sec performed basically the same as Docker-sec. The reason
is that, Lic-Sec mode3’s tracing starts after the container has been launched
so kernel operations performed for launching the container are not traced.
Since a large proportion of the trace is recorded during the launch time of
the container, workload is not increased significantly to the profile genera-
tor engine if trace starts during container’s runtime, which introduces nearly
ignorable overhead to the trace termination time.
Figure 4: profile generation time for Lic-Sec and LiCShield
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Figure 5: booting time for Lic-Sec and LiCShield
Figure 6: trace start time for Lic-Sec-mode2 and Docker-sec
8. Related Work
8.1. Container security solutions
Several previous research work address LSMs for Docker containers. Some
work focus on enhancing security by applying customized LSM modules poli-
cies such as AppArmor and SELinux. Docker-sec [22] and LiCShield[27]
which are discussed in this paper are two of them. Bacis et al. proposed a
solution based on SELinux hardening with an SELinux policy module added
to the Dockerfile. In this way, containerized processes are run with SELinux
types by binding SELinux policies with Docker container images, which spe-
cializes SELinux policy per-container or even per-process to increase Docker
security [5]. This kind of approach relies on the host to define and enforce
policies which infers that only the system administrator can use these ap-
proaches. Other than tailoring AppArmor and SELinux policies for each
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Figure 7: trace termination time for Lic-Sec-mode2 and Docker-sec
Figure 8: trace start time for Lic-Sec-mode3 and Docker-sec
container to enhance security, researchers are exploring other ways to enable
containers to use LSM modules to improve their own security. Y. Sun et
al. proposed the design of security namespace, which is a kernel abstraction
that enables containers to utilize a virtualization of the Linux kernel security
framework to achieve autonomous per-container security control [36]. The
main difference compared to our work is that, first, security namespace en-
ables the container to autonomously control its security rather than relying
on the system administrator to enforce the security control from the host.
In our work, the policies are defined and enforced solely by the host. In
[36], policies are pushed as string rules from the container directly to the
kernel without the involvement of the host. Second, the whole kernel secu-
rity framework could be used by containers rather than just limited security
features since security namespace virtualizes kernel security frameworks into
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Figure 9: trace termination time for Lic-Sec-mode3 and Docker-sec
virtual instances, each of which corresponds to one container. However, se-
curity namespace requires intensive modifications of the kernel base and the
LSM modules, and the policies are not automatically generated. The ex-
perimental results indicated that the security Namespaces can solve several
container security problems with acceptable performance overhead. DIVE
(Docker Integrity Verification Engine) [14] is an architecture to support in-
tegrity verification and remote attestation of Docker containers. DIVE relies
on a modified version of IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) which is
also a widely used LSM module [32], and OpenAttestation which is a well-
known tool for attestation of cloud services. With the help of DIVE, the
infrastructure manager can be informed of the specific compromised con-
tainer or hosting system and request to rebuild this single container. DIVE
is practical to deploy due to a nearly negligible performance impact on the
hosted services. Besides using LSM modules to improve Docker container se-
curity, kernel-based solutions are also proposed [30] [3]. These solutions aim
to provide a secure framework or wrapper to run Docker container. In the
work of Reid and Tim [30], a secure framework based on the Linux user and
mount namespaces called Charliecloud is proposed to run industry-standard
Docker containers without privileged operations or daemons on center re-
sources. Charliecloud is proved to avoid most security risks such as bypass of
file and directory permissions and chroot escape. In the work of [3], a secure
wrapper called Socker is described for running Docker containers on Slurm
and similar queuing system. The execution of containers within Slurm jobs
is enforced by Socker as the submitting user instead of root user to avoid the
privileged operations. Socker also bounds the resource usage of any container
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by the amount of resources assigned by Slurm.
There are some researches proposing security countermeasure or algo-
rithm against a particular attack category of container. This includes special
investigations on DoS attacks [12], container escape attacks [19], attacks
from the underlying compromised higher-privileged system software such as
the OS kernel and the hypervisor [2], covert channels attacks [24] and the
application level attacks [18]. In [12], Chelladhurai et. al apply three-tier
protection mechanism including memory limit assignment, memory reserva-
tion assignment and default memory value setting to defend against DoS
attacks. The main principle behind their mechanism is to limit the resource
consumption of the container. In [19], similar to our work, Jian et al. also
investigated Docker escape attacks but particularly focusing on Namespace
switching escapes. They proposed a defense based on Namespaces status
inspection against this kind of attacks. According to their solution, once a
different Namespaces tag is detected, the corresponding process will be killed
immediately and the malicious user will be tracked. The test results showed
that this defense can effectively prevent some real-world attacks. In [2],
SCONE is proposed, which is a secure container environment for Docker uti-
lizing Intel Software Guard eXtension (SGX) [17] to run Linux applications
in secure containers. The solutions provides confidentiality and integrity of
application data within containers. Covert channels attacks against Docker
containers are analyzed in [24]. In this paper, Luo et al. identify different
types of covert channel attacks in Docker and propose solutions of using and
configuring current security mechanisms provided by Docker to prevent those
attacks. They also stress that the deployment of a full-fledged SELinux or
AppArmor security policy is a key condition to protect the security perime-
ters of containers. Study about increase the application level isolation for
containers is presented in the work of Hunger et al. [18]. The authors pro-
pose DATS which is a system to run web applications that heavily access
data in shared folders and that are deployed with containers. The system
enforces non-interference across containers and is effective to mitigate all
data-disclosure vulnerabilities.
Some researches address network security challenges for Docker contain-
ers. In the work of Ranjbar et. al [31], they propose SynAPTIC architecture
to provide secure and persistent connectivity between containers based on the
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standard host identity protocol (HIP). Cilium 20 is an open source software
for transparently securing the network connectivity between application ser-
vices deployed using Linux container management platforms such as Docker
and Kubernetes. In the work of Secure Cloud [20], secure communication
among containerized services is realized with the support of Intels Software
Guard Extensions (SGX).
8.2. Container security testing and evaluation
Besides proposing security solutions and enhancements, previous researches
also present, similar to our work, evaluation of container security. Most of
them evaluate container security theoretically from the perspective of system
architecture and design principle [4] [11] [39] [29] [25][35]. In [21], Lin et. al,
described the first measurement study of Docker container’s security. We
have used a similar methodology in our investigation, but tailored it to the
Docker-sec evaluation target.
Some related researches are about early detection of Docker vulnerabili-
ties such as performing penetration tests [23], implementing static code ana-
lyzer [15], implementing static and dynamic vulnerability detection schemes
[37] and analyzing docker image vulnerabilities [34][40][8]. In [23], Tao et.
al clarified the importance of penetration testing technology in ensuring the
container security and studied some typical penetration test cases such as
container escape and DoS in container environment. Then they described
the penetration testing process in Docker container in details. In [15], Ana
et. al analyzed the applicability of static code analyzers in Docker code
base and concluded that these tools are very ineffective to detect Docker
vulnerabilities. But they got the same conclusion as in [23], i.e. Docker
vulnerabilities, especially bypass and privilege escalations, are easy to find
using penetration testing. A study on the effectiveness of various vulnerabil-
ity detection schemes for containers is conducted in [37] using 28 real world
vulnerability exploits. Their results showed that dynamic detection scheme
performs much better than static detection scheme. Combining static and
dynamic schemes can further increase the detection coverage. The authors in
[34] analyze the Docker Hub images by using the framework DIVA (Docker
Image Vulnerability Analysis). They studied 356,218 images and found that
both official and community images contain more than 180 vulnerabilities on
average. They recommend that automatic security updates could solve this
20https://github.com/cilium/cilium
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problem. In [40], an empirical study about the impact of npm JavaScript
package vulnerabilities in Docker images was conducted. The results showed
that the outdated npm packages in Docker images pose a risk of security
vulnerabilities so that the installed JavaScript packages should be up to date
to avoid potential security risks from Docker images. In [8], Brady et. al, de-
scribed a continuous integration and continuous deployment (CI/CD) system
to evaluate the security of Docker images under the scenario when container
is used as part of the software development. The results showed that the
system is effective to prevent publishing and reuse of images with known
vulnerabilities.
9. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we evaluated the security defense strength of Docker-sec by
testing real-world attacks on containers. We manually collected 42 exploits
out of 400 exploits from Exploit-db. The selected exploits were all effective
on container platforms with the default Docker security configurations. We
categorized the exploits into two categories, kernel-targeted exploits and user
space program targeted exploits.
Using the selected exploits, we tested the top 20 official images from
Docker registry hub in containers spawned with Docker-sec. We ran the test
on a host with a vulnerable kernel. Our investigation shows that for 18 out of
20 images, Docker-sec can defend against all attacks in the kernel target cate-
gory, which aim at escalating privileges inside or outside the container. Only
for two of the tested images, ’Docker in Docker’ and ’IBM DB2’, Docker-sec
was almost chance-less. This result clearly shows the benefits and limitations
with Docker-sec. The main strength with the approach is the capability to
release the end-user burden in configuring strict container security polices
as this is instead automated by Docker-sec. The resulting strict LSM gives
a reasonable level of security against kernel vulnerabilities. Still, as clearly
shown in our evaluation, for applications running on the container which re-
quire a broad set of privileges, the Docker-sec approach does not give much
additional security value.
We also tested vulnerable user space programs inside containers spawned
with Docker-sec and showed that Docker-sec failed to defend the attacks
exploiting vulnerabilities of a specific user space program. This is mainly
due to the fact that it can be launched independent of the Linux capabilities
and of network accesses. However, it is worth noticing, that even if Docker-
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sec was not directly effective against these types of vulnerabilities, the default
read-only restriction for file access still blocks propagation to the host from
the compromised container.
To address the issues which couldn’t be solved by Docker-sec, we intro-
duced an earlier proposed LSM called LiCShield due to its strengths which
Docker-sec lacks, i.e, LiCShield generates AppArmor profiles automatically
based on the traced kernel operations hence generated more types of rules.
We combined Docker-sec with a modified version of LiCShield to construct
a new AppArmor profile generator called Lic-Sec. Besides auditing capa-
bilities and network accesses, Lic-Sec was able to generate pivot root rules,
link rules, file access rules, mount rules and execution rules. We evaluated
the effectiveness of Lic-Sec against real-world exploits in the same way and
made a comparative analysis of the evaluation results and performance of
Docker-sec and Lic-Sec. The results showed that Lic-Sec was effective against
defending privilege escalation attacks and could block the execution and
propagation of all tested attacks with reasonable performance overhead. Al-
though the security evaluation of Lic-Sec is performed based on an old kernel
in order to make all kernel exploits available, we consider the experimental
evaluation results of Lic-Sec of protecting old kernels against privilege esca-
lation attacks could indicate that Lic-Sec has the potential to defend against
zero-day attacks in the future.
It is left to future work to compare Lic-Sec against other LSM based pro-
tection approaches such as the ones presented in [36][5]. Then we will get an
even better understanding of the strength of Lic-Sec compared with alterna-
tive available tools. Also, in order further assess the strength/weaknesses of
Lic-Sec, it remains to test it using penetration testing tools and additional
exploit datasets.
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